

FOREIGN POLICY

The Cosmopolitan Rejoinder

Professor Mary Kaldor in conversation with
James Stafford and George Morris

Over a career spanning five decades, the peace activist and academic Mary Kaldor has argued for a cosmopolitan left: supportive of global governance, the European Union and the human rights movement, and sceptical of the nation-state's ability to provide security or justice. *Renewal* met Kaldor to discuss her support for left campaigns against Brexit, and to ask what remains of projects for a left-liberal globalism in our current age of revived national power-politics.

Europe and the Cold War

James Stafford: You were involved with European Nuclear Disarmament (END) and with Hungarian and other Eastern European dissident movements in the 1970s and 1980s. How important were those experiences for forming your subsequent scholarship and activism?

Mary Kaldor: They were actually pivotal. My first job after university was working for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and my early work in the 1970s was very much about the arms trade and military technology. When in 1980 we founded END – it really shifted, I think, the way I thought and what I thought was important. END seemed to suit me very well, because my father was Hungarian, my Uncle had been a dissident, in prison from 1948 to 1956; the idea that we would try to end the Cold War by bringing democracy to Eastern Europe, and that this was the best way to get rid of nuclear weapons, was a very appealing idea.

There were two big influences arising from that: E. P. Thompson and his conception of 'history from below', driven by citizens' movements; and travelling to

Eastern Europe and meeting all these incredible intellectuals who were developing completely new concepts, like civil society; that was new to us then ... anti-politics, the nature of totalitarianism, it was an entirely new experience. That had a huge influence on my subsequent thinking.

JS: Can you say a little more about END: what made it a distinctive position in the left of the 1970s and 1980s, compared to left positions on the Cold War?

MK: At the end of the 1970s, the Americans announced the deployment of Cruise and Pershing Missiles and the British announced they were replacing Polaris with Trident; that was the beginning of a new wave of anti-nuclear activism. I'd been involved in the first wave, my mother was an anti-nuclear activist, I'd been involved in Young CND; that's why I went to SIPRI, I was very committed to the anti-Cold War agenda.

END was actually started by E.P. Thompson; I was one of the founding members. Thompson launched this appeal in 1980 alongside Ken Coates and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.¹ The idea was that instead of merely focusing on unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain, we would talk about a nuclear-free Europe 'from Poland to Portugal', and we would link democracy to disarmament.

What was interesting was that Thompson was very keen not to split the movement. We produced this pamphlet, largely written by Edward, called 'Protest and Survive'; even though lots of groups were springing up all over the country, some even calling themselves END, Edward recommended that everybody join CND, the old campaign for unilateral disarmament for Britain.²

But there were still deep political divisions; which interestingly enough are echoed now in our current debate over Brexit. It feels very much the same to me. A lot of people in CND felt that you should end the Cold War by making peace with the Soviet Union; that nuclear disarmament came before human rights, both because a nuclear war was the worst thing that could possibly happen, but also because if you created peace between us and the Communists, somehow human rights would follow.

Whereas we made a different argument – actually initially on tactical grounds. It had always been easy for governments to attack the peace movement on the basis that we were fellow-travelers with the Soviet Union. It was very easy to marginalise the peace movement. By showing that we really were engaged with and cared about human rights in Eastern Europe, it gave us a certain degree of integrity.

JS: It feels to me that this paradigm of European or global civil society; of cosmopolitanism; of human rights discourse is coming in from a lot of criticism from the left. A kind of left neo-realism, people like Perry Anderson or Peter Gowan, is

becoming the left's dominant mode of thinking about world politics.³ Why do you think that is happening?

MK: I think that was one big mistake we made. The Eastern Europeans we talked to and engaged with, they really ended up as neoliberals. Of course we were critical of neoliberalism, but we felt that wasn't the key issue: the key issue was democracy and human rights. And my worry is, now, that the thrust of the left is anti-neoliberal, but people are forgetting the importance of democracy and human rights.

There was always this idea that socialism needs the state; and that social justice is perhaps more important than political and civil rights. That was true in the 1980s as well. I remember I wrote an essay called 'Warfare and Capitalism', in which I argued that the Soviet system was a war system.⁴ It wasn't a socialist system; it was a war system organised like capitalism is in war-time. Centralised planning, autarchy, the state controlling everything....

People were quite unhappy with the argument. They still saw Eastern Europe as socialist. I think now people still think that socialism is about defence of the state. Whereas activists for human rights see international institutions like the UN and the EU as their allies, activists for social justice hate the World Bank and the IMF and the international financial institutions. They see the state as the alternative, rather than arguing for the reform of global governance.

Socialism and the Nation-State

George Morris: It's striking that one of the things about the 'human security' approach you advocate is that it goes beyond the state: both in terms of international institutions but also civil society. But as you say in your latest book, the trajectory of global politics is back towards the nation-state. Is there any point in the left advocating for reform of the international system? How would we do it?

MK: I think it's the only possibility, actually. It just seems to me that the Lexit argument that we're better off in a nation-state ... it doesn't take into account how incredibly interconnected the world is – not just in terms of economics, but also in terms of politics and culture.

Beyond that, it doesn't take into account the fact that a very powerful state enables authoritarianism and doomed attempts to control borders and immigration. I just don't think it's feasible any longer. All it will lead to is increased violence and violations of human rights.

It seems to me that the only alternative is reform of international institutions. The question then is how do we do that as left-wing movements. It's about creating

alliances; but key to it all is the European Union. Reforming the European Union is the only way to reform global governance.

JS: Why is that? Is it because global governance has been constructed on a European model?

MK: It's precisely because the European Union is not a state. States were constructed through war, by and large. The European Union was constructed against war. Through this sort of odd negotiating process it's stumbled on a model for global governance. What's incredibly interesting about the EU ... while on the one hand, especially with regard to the Euro, it imposes neoliberal rules; on the other hand, in areas of digital rights, the environment, human security, it's actually very progressive. As such, it therefore could play – as it already does, for instance, in climate change negotiations – an incredibly active role in global debates, and in constructing global governance.

What I've been arguing is that you start with the Weberian assumption that institutions are shaped by their sources of finance. You could imagine multi-level global governance, in which global institutions would be financed by a Tobin Tax, by a carbon tax, by taxing multinationals, leaving the state responsible for income tax, and municipalities for property taxes, congestion charging, local taxing. Different institutions with different sources of revenue, including those that escape the nation-state. The object isn't to replace the nation-state, but to modify their worst elements: war and authoritarianism.

GM: What does that mean for Britain after Brexit?

MK: There's no good Brexit. A hard Brexit is a pure disaster. But a soft Brexit means that we're rule-takers with no involvement in decisions: that's pretty bad too.

What I think Brexit has done is to Europeanise the left. When we had the referendum, politics was extremely parochial. What's happened is that a whole generation of people are discovering Europe and discovering what Europe means, and getting engaged, and starting to organise and get involved in transnational movements and groups.

I think there's an important point there: everyone goes on about the European democratic deficit; but in formal, procedural terms it's not as bad as people say. We have an elected parliament, we have a council of ministers in which we participated, we have the Citizens' Initiative, we have a lot more civil society participation ... mostly corporate in the economic field, but on digital democracy, environment, and security there's a lot of civil society participation.⁵

But what is lacking is European politics. We could do a lot with the existing institutions. Of course I'd prefer it if we had an elected president or whatever. But it's not

about that. It's actually about whether people feel politically engaged with European issues. And the problem is that until now people haven't. There isn't a European public sphere. And paradoxically Brexit may have helped to create one.

JS: Left-wing arguments for the EU seem to involve a lot of abstraction from what it does day-to-day, the decisions it makes. In the past few months, with the chaos over asylum policy and the Mediterranean border, the fresh moves to relocate the European border to north Africa, the statements of politicians like Matteo Salvini in Italy and Horst Seehofer in Germany, it seems like there's a real danger that a new and different Europe is being born. A Europe that has always been there; a Europe that's both neo-colonial and a bounded, a kind of Christian civilisational entity. That's always been one part of the justificatory repertoire of the EU.

MK: Churchill saying we could pool our colonies!

JS: Exactly. But my underlying point is that not all Lexiteers are nationalist. The argument they would make is that the EU is a barrier to an effective internationalism. You would need to rip it up and start again.

MK: That's what they said about Yugoslavia. If we ripped it apart we'd get even more very nasty, closed-in, nationalist politics. We wouldn't get a new internationalism.

I want to go right back to the beginning. I feel that it's about what the END dialogue achieved. What I think we achieved is that we did change the discourse. That was key to ending the Cold War. We did bring peace and human rights together, we talked about global civil society, cosmopolitanism, humanitarianism, which became the dominant discourse in the 1990s.

That's what enabled 1989 to succeed. Of course in retrospect I think neoliberalism was also very important. One of the reasons the 1989 revolutions were so peaceful was that the communists saw an opportunity to convert their political positions into economic gain. And they all gained like mad from privatisation and liberalisation and became oligarchs. Which wasn't the case for the Arab uprisings: they were already very rich, they already were crony capitalists, there was nothing they could gain by giving in to democracy.

We have to work to change the discourse again across Europe. For me, a starting point is the idea that actually the refugee crisis was constructed. Even in 2015, when there was a huge influx of Syrian refugees – although many also came from Africa – even then, if we had allowed them in legally across Europe, they were a tiny proportion of the people who come in legally. It suited right-wing politicians to make the whole crisis much more visible. It's absurd that we had 150,000 people in Calais. Surely we could have dealt with that. We are not going to be able to stop mobility, all we can do is manage it; ensure that if we do have a big influx we have enough resources to say,

improve the National Health Service. We can't actually halt it. It's not possible or feasible. Trying to halt it will lead us into very nasty, racist, destructive policies.

Changing asylum policy and changing economic policy are the centre-pieces for changing Europe. A Corbyn government inside Europe could have an enormous effect, providing a magnet for left-wing movements across Europe. We have already seen big changes with the Portuguese, the Greeks, maybe now Spain ... Politics does shift!

Staying in the EU would give Labour more space with business and financial markets to implement McDonnell's economic programme and make it a real success. But it would also mean it would be easier to unite with other groups across Europe and to campaign against austerity and for European reform. Labour needs a strategy for European reform. Britain on its own is really powerless. But within the EU it could really have a big influence on pushing progressive policies, and also pushing for reform of other international organisations. It's an amazing opportunity that I feel is being lost.

GM: I'm intrigued by how you see post-Brexit politics. Does that mean that British progressives should just spend the foreseeable future campaigning to get back in?

MK: No, or rather not only that. Whether Brexit happens or not they should be joining with other movements across Europe. It should still be supporting other left movements and campaigning for reform.

JS: I guess this is where the END thing comes back for me. If you're coming from a background of working with civil society across the Iron Curtain; then why is it necessarily an issue to work with European socialists if Britain isn't in the EU?

GM: E. P. Thompson was famously hostile to the EEC.

MK: It was very different in 1975. His position was not anti-Europeanism—it was anti the Common Market. I can't actually remember how I voted. Which is weird! But I remember being very critical of the Common Market.

The reason I think it will be much harder is because we'll be able to have much less influence outside the EU institutions. Of course we can still continue to do it, but the whole progressive movement will have a huge set-back if Brexit goes ahead.

JS: It's interesting, being against the Common Market but in favour of the EU, because that's what we're headed back to, a 'mere' Common Market, with none of the political or social features.

MK: Exactly, the current Labour position is support for the Common Market but not for freedom of movement or European democracy! It's absurd that this is what Corbyn and McDonnell are favouring.

Civil Society and 'Human Security'

GM: I wanted to change tack and talk more about civil society and 'human security' outside of Europe. One of the things you talk about a lot is putting civil society at the heart of peace-building and 'intervention'. I'm intrigued by the mechanism by which you can actually do that. In Syria, the UN's attempts to talk about civil society groups have always appeared basically cosmetic.

MK: I'll go back and start with the Bosnian war.

First of all, what is civil society in wartime situations? Most of the contemporary conflicts that we talk about start with democracy protests, and democracy protests that are very inclusive. The Bosnia War began with people shooting on a peace demonstration and the first person to die was actually from Croatia. So what happens is that the outside world tends to equate the democracy movements with one side in the violence: in Bosnia it was considered to be on the Muslim side and in Syria it's considered to be on the opposition side, but that's not what happened at all.

In fact in both cases the vast majority of protestors believed in non-violence. They thought that if they turned to violence they would be defeated, and that the only way to shift to democracy was changing attitudes, changing the discourse.

The people who were in the protest movements were either the first to get killed or had to leave, or they turned themselves into civil society. So they became groups that provided humanitarian assistance, they were mediating local ceasefires, they were keeping schools and hospitals open, they were documenting war crimes and human rights violations. And those people actually represent a political position. They're anti-sectarian. So actually these wars in my view are wars of sectarianism against counter-sectarianism.

The second point is your question about how to help civil society. It's treating them as a partner, treating them as a side. But there are two different ways that I would talk about. The UN talks are really fascinating, we're following really closely the role of civil society. Staffan di Mistura, the UN special envoy to Syria, created this civil society room that was supposed to be a big innovation. Actually what's happened is that the main talks are going absolutely nowhere. But the civil society people are gaining huge amounts just from talking to each other, and they've asked Staffan di Mistura if they can continue the talks even if the talks between armed groups stop. So that's turned out to be actually a lot more interesting than anyone anticipated.

GM: I know people who are at those talks who say it's really useful meeting all these people, but useless in terms of the conflict.

MK: The argument I made for years is that the problem is that we focus on the violence but there are areas that civil society has kept peaceful – I've called them

'islands of civility'.⁶ And it's those areas that actually the international community should focus on, protecting those areas and allowing them to spread, rather than focusing on trying to create a peace from above between the armed groups who are not interested in peace because they're gaining a lot from the violence.

A very good Syrian example is Eastern Ghouta. After the chemical warfare attacks it was civil society that negotiated a ceasefire. At that point we could have had a resolution in the UN Security Council saying the UN should be deployed to monitor, to uphold the ceasefire – none of that happened. Ceasefires like that are sort of surrenders to the Assad regime, but on the other hand if the UN were there you could lessen the repression that's going on when the regime takes over again.

GM: As you say, at this stage in Syria it's about managing the surrender. How about trying to build mechanisms into future situations?

MK: I can only describe it retrospectively, but the huge mistake with Syria was to demand regime change rather than saying you're not supposed to bomb your citizens. That's what needed to change. I mean Syria's really interesting from the point of view of the EU, because the EU had the most leverage of any state at the beginning of the war. It was in the middle of negotiating an Association Agreement. And it simply followed the American lead, withdrew everything, imposed blanket sanctions, and said Assad must go, which actually was totally ineffective. They could have used all their mechanisms and tried to put pressure on the regime to act differently.

Preserving and extending the role of UN monitors instead of withdrawing them would also have been an incredibly important thing to do. I can think of similar things one might have said in other conflicts, but what I guess I'm really saying is that first of all the pressure has to be on stopping illegal behaviour. And secondly on supporting and strengthening what civil society is trying to do.

Another very good example is Libya. When the Responsibility to Protect resolution was passed in the Security Council it was given to NATO instead of the EU. The EU would have had a quite different policy because the EU is much more in line with a 'human security' approach.

What they wanted to do was to stop Gadhafi from attacking Benghazi. NATO sent out planes to destroy his forces but then they didn't know what to do next. So they empowered local armed groups and they called for regime change, which wasn't Responsibility to Protect.

The alternative would have been to declare Benghazi, which had been liberated by civil society, a safe, protected area, have a presence on the ground to protect it, and help develop local governance, and local development, and do the same when other areas liberated themselves, and that way they would have stopped the spread of armed groups and they would have allowed the peaceful overthrow of Gadhafi.

GM: It's striking I think that we're talking about 'good' and 'bad' interventions, rather than intervention in an abstract way, because obviously so much of the debate in the Labour Party and on the Left is about 'for' or 'against'.

MK: I agree. My point has always been that there's good and bad interventions. Iraq and Afghanistan were bad. Bosnia was an experiment in what was good, it just didn't go far enough.

GM: This is the other thing as well, it's not even just 'good' and 'bad'...

MK: Exactly, exactly.

GM: As I say, the debate on the Left is dominated by that sort of language. But how do we get out of that?

MK: Well that's why I wrote this book, called *Global Security Cultures*, because my point is that there are different security cultures and they have different forms of intervention, and we should try to understand that.⁷ We should understand that in a globalised world whatever we do is a form of intervention.

JS: A lot of the hostility to intervention *per se* on the Left comes from is the idea that there are legacies of colonialism involved. Western European countries are rarely intervened upon. Intervention is in one direction. This is a problem with cosmopolitanism in general—how you can project the idea of an international community without asking the question, 'whose international community'? Who made the rules, who sets the norms, who gets to go around enforcing them?

MK: I suppose my answer would be the same as I said before, which is that we're intervening whether we like it or not. There are big companies intervening, all kinds of activities going on. There are private security contractors. Surely one wants a socially responsive international intervention.

Then you ask who is the international community, who is global civil society. Obviously it's dominated by the rich and powerful. But here I'd say there is a difference between hegemony and domination, there is a difference between international relations and imperialism. A set of international relations in the frame of international law are still likely to be unfair and uneven, but nevertheless they offer space for deliberation, for discussion, for arguing.

I think welfare of various kinds does require some kind of power. I agree with Mark Duffield when he says that human security is bio-political. He has this sort of Foucauldian argument that intervention is bio-politics - of course it's bio-politics.⁸ But actually Foucault doesn't necessarily say that bio-politics is good or bad, it's dominated by governmentality but you can resist. And I think it's better to have human security than nothing.

The advantage of global civil society over imperialism is that it's not just the governments, there is a debate at civil society level. Nevertheless it's a debate that's dominated by the rich and powerful. And the argument I would make is, I'm aware of that, and I'm aware that this is a huge problem, but at least it is hegemony rather than domination, which is a contrast with imperialism. And at least that offers an opening for people to engage and participate. There's a huge raft of international law-making where civil society's played a big role, like climate change or the landmines treaty or the cluster munitions treaty.

The other thing I think the Left argument, the anti-colonial argument, fails to take into account is the huge exploitation of local elites. Is the Assad regime better than European colonialism? They're probably better than European colonialism in some respects, but they're pretty horrible.

GM: A big part of this debate is the problem of moral legitimacy. The major powers and the big international organisations. How can global civil society help to rebuild that?

MK: It's a huge problem because we're going in the opposite direction. I mean, everything Trump does, a lot of what Theresa May does is really undermining legitimacy. The UN lost so much legitimacy because it went into Iraq after the Americans invaded, and you remember the terrorist attack on UN headquarters – it was the moment it lost its ability to move around conflict zones peacefully because it had legitimacy.

There's a huge weakening of international legitimacy as a consequence both of the war on terror and the return of geopolitics. Liberal Peace, which is so criticised by so many on the left ... I share a lot of their criticisms but I feel it's the only pathway to a superior alternative model. Whether it can regain legitimacy is really open to question. If we don't regain legitimacy in international institutions we're going to really see the spread of a global new war, which will really be very frightening.

The continuing rise of 'new wars'

JS: And do you mean new war in your specific theoretical sense?

MK: Yes. I don't mean that we'll have World War Three, but I think that we'll have new wars in my theoretical meaning. Those are incredibly difficult to end. They're incredibly persistent. They're more like a societal condition than a conflict.

I don't know if there were ever old wars, but old wars are our stylised conception of war, which is a deep-rooted political contest that can only be solved either by one side winning or by political talks. New wars are not like that. New wars involve numerous armed groups, who gain from violence itself rather than from winning or

losing. They gain because new wars are a way to mobilise extremist ideologies, and they gain from pillage, hostage-taking.

A lot of this my more recent thinking about this came engaging with Clausewitz. Clausewitz's basic theory is that war tends to the extreme, and he comes to this proposition through his definition of war, which is war is a deep-rooted contest of wills. But war can also be a kind of mutual enterprise in which everyone is gaining from fighting. If that's the case, then it tends not so much to extremism as to persistence; it's incredibly difficult to end.

JS: And you can see even the Western European capitalist societies falling into that?

MK: They're displaying elements of that, exactly. The rise of armed gangs, the rise of terrorism, the rise of racist behaviour; and linked very often. The networks of power and dark money behind Brexit are linked to both organised crime and racist violence.

GM: It's interesting how you're bringing in ideas of economic justice implicitly there. In a lot of your writing gender features in the same way. Could you talk more about the gendered elements of new wars?

MK: Let me start with economic justice. I think there was a break at the end of the eighties. The civil wars of the seventies and eighties were typical left-right wars: between a guerrilla movement and a regime. Rebels behaved like quasi-states.

I think there was a big shift at the end of the eighties when you started to get more and more rentier-type economies, when politicians saw the advantage of violence for capturing power, and rebel groups tended not to be led by romantic left-wing intellectuals but by former regime types. You got a shift among intellectuals towards non-violence. I think very key to all this was the shift from authoritarian, often planned economies, under the pressure of liberalisation. You got the development of a kind of crony-capitalism, but also much more extreme inequality.

I think all wars are highly gendered and that war is a mechanism for constructing masculinity. But I think there's a difference between old and new wars, at least in theory. In old wars it was the typical idea of the man as the hero, protecting the women at home. New wars are very different: they involve a much lower level of participation, but also very extreme forms of masculinity. All wars actually involve sexual violence, but in old wars they tended to be a side-effect rather than a central tactic.

In many contemporary wars it's a central tactic, because it serves the goal of population displacement. So typically new wars involve very few battles. Instead most of the violence is directed against civilians, with the aim of establishing political control. The easiest way to create political control is by getting rid of

everybody who doesn't agree with you or are of a different ethnicity. Rape is a means of achieving that.

All this produces a very extreme and unstable form of masculinity, one that can only be reproduced through continuing violence. Young men who are unemployed regain their sense of masculinity by becoming soldiers.

GM: What about at the level of politics and leadership? Is masculinity a driving factor in the same way?

MK: Oh definitely, because all these ideologies are extremely patriarchal. All of these nationalist and religious groups always seem to involve a very extreme view of patriarchy. And interestingly all the counter-sectarian groups, particularly in the Syrian case, involve a feminist impetus.

JS: I wanted to link new wars back to the EU, and to end on something very contemporary. There is now this expanded move to effectively – as I understand it – co-opt Libyan gangs to defend the Mediterranean border, helping to keep Libyan society in exactly the condition of 'new war' that you describe. How can those sorts of tendencies in European policy be challenged and transcended?

MK: What is so striking is that there's huge contradictions between different bits of EU policy. We did a contribution to the EU's global strategies review, 'Hybrid Peace to Human Security', and we were arguing that because the EU is a new kind of institution, like I was saying at the beginning, it has to have a different kind of policy. The EU should be a new kind of twenty-first century model of global governance, but it often behaves in state-like ways, in twentieth-century ways.⁹ The whole business of the camps and Libya and trying to close the borders are very typical, backward, twentieth-century ways of doing politics.

On the other side of the coin, the EU's official security strategy involves a completely different set of policies towards places like Libya and Syria: it's more of a contribution to UN missions even though the strategy is based on human security and involves, if you like, a revision of the Liberal Peace. An interesting example is Libya, even though it's actually a UN operation. Ghassan Salamé, who is the UN Special Representative to Libya, is doing so many interesting things in terms of trying to construct legitimate municipalities, build on civil society, and generate inclusive dialogue.

There are different bits of the EU that are operating in completely contradictory ways. This is where the Left should come in and say: we need support for the municipalities, we need support for civil society and we need to bring civil society groups from Libya, from Syria, to the centre, to the European Parliament. This is the kind of thing we ought to be doing.

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Further Reading

M. Kaldor, *Global Security Cultures*, Cambridge, Polity, 2018.
 -- *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity, 1999.
 -- (with L. Cooper et. al), *The Corbyn Moment and European Socialism*, London, Another Europe is Possible, 2018. Online at: <https://www.anothereurope.org/new-report-the-corbyn-moment-and-european-socialism/>.

Notes

- 1 Ken Coates, 'European Nuclear Disarmament', in *Spokesman* 38, 1980. Online at: <http://www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/100Coates.pdf>.
- 2 E.P. Thompson, 'Protest and Survive', Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1980.
- 3 Wolfgang Streeck, 'You need a gun', *London Review of Books*, 14 December 2017. Online at: <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n24/wolfgang-streeck/you-need-a-gun>.
- 4 Mary Kaldor, 'Warfare and Capitalism', in E.P. Thompson et al. *Exterminism and Cold War*, London, Verso, 1981.
- 5 The European Citizens' Initiative is a mechanism through which European citizens can directly petition the European Commission to make a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. See European Commission, *A Guide to the European Citizens' Initiative*, Brussels, EU Publications, 2016, online at: <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d5c945cb-06ba-11e6-b713-01aa75ed71a1>.
- 6 Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity, 1999, pp50, 110-1.
- 7 Mary Kaldor, *Global Security Cultures*, Cambridge, Polity, 2018.
- 8 Mark Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*, Cambridge, Polity, 2007.
- 9 Human Security Study Group, *From Hybrid Peace to Human Security: Rethinking the EU strategy towards conflict*, 2016.