Starmer’s Labour and the devolution agenda

New Labour came to power in 1997 with a mandate to hold referendums on devolution in Scotland and Wales. After successful votes, the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments held their first elections 25 years ago. These reforms – along with the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland – transformed the territorial constitution of the UK. Despite initial Conservative opposition, it quickly became hard to imagine the new institutions as anything other than permanent features of the administrative landscape.

As devolution to Scotland and Wales turns 25, its architects look set to form the next UK government. Devolution is again on Labour’s agenda, and as an election approaches its priorities in this area are emerging; a focus on completing the process of English devolution and creating a better system for the different authorities and governments across the UK to coordinate and cooperate. Both these objectives are in some senses unfinished business for the party: New Labour failed to create a system of shared government out of devolution (a reason why ‘devolve and forget’ gained such purchase in subsequent commentary). And a lack of successful parallel reform for England or its regions is often seen as a significant second failing. 

Unlike in 1997, if Labour gets into power now the party will be building on Conservative policy in this area. But while there is continuity, there is also ideological departure – both from the Tory approach and that of New Labour. The emphasis from Starmer’s Labour on ‘partnership’ and expanding (and deepening) English devolution is in keeping with its broader turn to ‘mission-driven’ government and industrial strategy. On this account, these goals will be a shared endeavour, requiring the capacity and area-specific knowledge of decision-makers beyond Whitehall and Westminster. All five of the missions involve areas of policy that are devolved. If ‘devolve and forget’ was in some ways a corollary of New Labour neoliberalism, the language of partnership and coordination reflects the shift to ‘mission-driven’ government under Starmer and Reeves. 

There is, then, a logic to what Labour has been saying on devolution, and the party has indicated what it sees as its purpose. But there is a lot that is yet to be fleshed out. At its most radical this project could amount to a rewiring of the way the state operates and how its different parts relate to one another. It could also mean a more dispersed, pluralistic democratic landscape. Yet there are multiple challenges to this vision, and whether it is realised will depend on the specific decisions Labour takes if it gets into office. 

English devolution

‘Power and partnership: Labour’s plan to power up Britain’, which launched the party’s 2024 local elections campaign, promised three fundamental reforms: empowerment of local communities; a more active centre of government; and stronger partnership between Westminster and local leaders. All councils outside of existing English devolution deals would be asked to prepare to join together ‘on sensible economic geographies’, before being in line for new powers over transport, skills, housing, planning employment support and energy.

In essence, Labour’s plan is to work within the existing framework but speed up, deepen and better connect. This has the benefit of pace and consistency. But even so there are questions that need further consideration. If a Labour government wants to complete the map of English devolution in the timeframe it envisages it will likely have to intervene as there are different local perspectives on the right geographies. Leaving this to local negotiation alone will take much longer. 

A second issue relates to accountability. The discussion around English devolution has primarily focused on powers, geographies, structures and partnerships. Recent work from the Productivity Institute has highlighted the degree to which accountability has largely been left out of the picture. At present, the model is primarily ‘top down’, with local leaders accountable to central government – a consequence of the contractual approach that has been taken to devo-deals so far. The report’s authors advocate a reimagining of accountability arrangements so there is a greater emphasis on local leaders challenging central government decisions, along with better internal scrutiny procedures and stronger accountability to local people. There is an important, related, point here. Under the Conservatives, a ‘top down’ perspective on English devolution has been dominant. On this account, new regional institutions are given powers primarily in order to tackle certain central government priorities, in particular around regional inequality and economic growth. However, as Jack Newman and James Hickson write, this focus neglects a ‘bottom-up’ perspective by which English devolution is ‘more fundamentally, about a new constitutional settlement that alters existing power dynamics’, and where empowered regional leaders represent ‘a potential counterweight to central government power’. 

Labour’s plan to ‘power up Britain’ talks of giving areas the ‘tools they need to grow’ and is clear that as well as local leaders being ‘active players’, ‘it will require a greater level of strategy and direction from national government.’ But to focus exclusively on delivery and implementation of national priorities would be to miss an opportunity to make the English devolution agenda also about revitalising local democracy, and creating a more pluralistic, balanced territorial constitution. 

Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Labour has signalled its intention to improve relations with the devolved governments and create a more cooperative union. However, the political dynamics of the union have changed considerably since Labour left office and present a more challenging environment.

In 2010, an SNP minority government in Scotland seemed like a momentary blip. Now the SNP has been in government for 17 years. And recent sociological research suggests that support for independence is not going away, regardless of the SNP’s recent travails. Support for independence has also risen in Wales and the Welsh Labour government espouses a ‘radical federalist’ understanding of the union as voluntary and in which sovereignty is shared. While power-sharing is now back up and running in Northern Ireland, democratic consent mechanisms relating to Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit arrangements mean that contestation on this divisive issue is now baked into the system. The ‘muscular’, integrationist form of unionism on display in particular under Boris Johnson and most distinctly embodied in the UK Internal Market Act severely damaged trust between the devolved and UK governments. 

Labour has indicated it will strike a more conciliatory, respectful tone in its dealings with the devolved governments. As the architects of devolution, there will be less suspicion that a Labour government would secretly like to row back on or undermine the powers of governments in other parts of the UK. And in general – though not exclusively – the party is more at home with the idea of a multinational Union in which there are different legitimate sites of democratic authority. 

More regular engagement and a shift in attitude will likely ameliorate some of the tensions that have been festering since the nadir in relations during the Brexit process. But making positive noises about partnership and cooperation will only get Labour so far. In practice, this kind of rhetoric may come up against the political incentives of would-be partners. The SNP has a motivation to show that even under a devo-sympathetic government the Union doesn’t work for Scotland. Welsh Labour will want to distinguish itself from a UK Labour government and demonstrate to its electorate that it is not the UK party’s lapdog (a dynamic that will also apply to the large cohort of newly-elected Labour metro-mayors). In a potential sign of tensions to come, UK Labour has expressed opposition to the Welsh Labour government’s longstanding call for the devolution of justice and policing to Wales. 

In office, Labour would also have to decide whether to amend or replace the UK Internal Market Act, which continues to cause friction with the Scottish and Welsh governments. A more flexible approach to the operation of the legislation than has been taken by the Tories might help reduce tensions in the short term. However, the Scottish and Welsh governments will likely continue to push for a more fundamental overhaul of how the post-Brexit internal market is managed. 

Northern Ireland presents its own set of challenges. The Executive may be functioning again but polling suggests the Northern Irish public are not optimistic that this situation will last. If the DUP again decides to collapse the power sharing institutions in opposition to Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit arrangements, a Labour government will have to decide how to respond. Sunak’s government had to give considerable assurances about Northern Ireland’s place within the Union to convince the DUP back into the Executive, arguably failing to act with the ‘rigorous impartiality’ required by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Would Labour do the same? 

While the break-up of the UK seems a more distant prospect than it has done for several years, the UK’s territorial politics remain fractious. These dynamics and how to navigate them present one of the major challenges to realising the vision of ‘partnership’ that lies at the heart of Labour’s prospectus on devolution. 

Intergovernmental relations 

Labour’s ‘plan to power up Britain’ contains a pledge to ‘[develop] new structures for intergovernmental working and deeper cooperation’, but details are scarce. Brown’s constitutional commission, which reported in 2022, contained more substantive and, indeed, radical thinking on this question. The commission proposed a legally mandated ‘Council of the Nation and Regions’, a Council of the UK, and a Council of England, that would engage in joint decision making and joint policy initiatives. Ciaran Martin has written that Brown’s suggestion of a solidarity clause – mirroring the EU’s ‘sincere cooperation’ commitment – would ‘take the UK constitution, built as it is on a single centre of authority at Westminster, into new territory.’ Indeed, Brown’s talk of ‘shared government’ goes beyond the language of partnership that Labour has adopted subsequently, and would mean a more significant departure from the UK’s current constitutional arrangements. 

From the outset, this kind of ‘shared governance’ was a notable absence from the system of devolution that was instituted in the UK. As Professor Michael Kenny details in his book Fractured Union, there was an initial preference for informal bilateral engagement between levels of government. There was a failure to adapt to devolution at the centre, creating what he refers to as a system of ‘side by side’ governance, with the processes and structures common in other devolved and federal countries to ensure joint working considered unnecessary in the UK context. The general deficiency of the UK’s intergovernmental relations machinery was highlighted acutely during the Brexit and Covid crises. New structures, which were widely seen as an improvement, were finally established in 2022. Nevertheless, they remain primarily forums for engagement and contain no decision-making capacity.

Moving to a situation in which there was a greater degree of formalised collaboration and joint decision-making on cross-cutting challenges such as climate change (one of Labour’s five missions) would be a significant step. But would a Labour government be willing to apply this in any way to reserved areas, such as, say, foreign policy? And as Ciaran Martin also points out, there are questions as to how decisions would be taken, and what would occur if agreement can’t be reached. Comparative work in this area suggests that co-decision mechanisms in intergovernmental relations tend to operate on a consensus basis rather than any kind of voting procedure. Yet this still leaves open the question of what happens when disagreement persists and consensus can’t be reached. A more extensive and independent dispute resolution mechanism could be established. But any genuinely legally binding process would in practice involve doing away with parliamentary sovereignty – something which neither the Brown commission nor Labour’s subsequent pronouncements indicate is on the cards. The ultimate decision-making power will continue to reside in Westminster. Some restraint from the UK government will therefore be required for this new era of partnership to work.

A further, and final, issue which will demand more thought is how to bring English representation into the intergovernmental relations system. Again, Labour has so far been vague on this. It has committed to ‘a new institutional framework’. But it is not clear, for example, whether this envisages a new forum for coordination between metro mayors and central government, or reform of existing structures to bring English regional leaders into interaction with the devolved governments and central government. One of the common criticisms of the existing structures is that they lack any specifically English or English regional representation. But bringing English regional leadership into the machinery on an equal footing to the devolved governments would bring its own difficulties. Reform in this area is needed, but Labour will have to tread carefully when it comes to the institutional specifics and how they might be perceived. 

Reforming the UK’s system of intergovernmental relations and realising its vision of partnership will require more than warm words from Labour. The question is whether the party is willing to put in the hard yards, or whether it will fall into a pattern of control from Whitehall.  

Conclusion

Labour has its fair share of devo-sceptics, who argue that dispersing power will hinder the party in achieving its national priorities. The leadership’s primary riposte has been that to deliver on these priorities it needs the expertise, capacity and input of leaders outside of Whitehall and Westminster. This is no doubt true. But it assumes a degree of buy-in which should not be taken for granted. 

In order to achieve its five missions and a meaningful restructuring of how and where decisions are taken across the UK, Labour will have to work hard to generate a degree of consensus and shared endeavour around its project. This will be aided by a Labour government in Wales and the party having won 10 metro-mayors out of a total of 11 in England at the recent local elections. But despite its recent difficulties the SNP remains in power in Scotland. And as English devolution develops there will undoubtedly be more regional leaders from other parties. As Jack Shaw and Patrick Diamond have written, ‘Labour needs to acknowledge that governing requires mobilising a coalition of actors whose actions Labour does not directly control’. But as they also note, ‘the Labour Party has ingrained centralising tendencies that have long influenced the British socialist tradition’. 

The temptation once in power to retain control and command from the centre will be strong. Yet to do so would likely have implications for trust as well as for effective delivery: both from the devolved governments, but also English regions towards whom the language of ‘take back control’ that Labour has adopted has been directed. 

Alex Walker works at a think tank and writes on constitutional issues.