Why manifesto promises should be considered sacred

With economic pressures mounting, rumours were afoot that the most clearly defined and recognisable manifesto commitment—not raising income tax—was set to be broken. This led to an intense debate among the commentariat and Labour Party MPs about whether departing from the pledges made in a manifesto is either an unforgivable mistake or simply understood by the public as something that happens during the course of a government’s lifetime. But after much speculation, attempts to sell the idea to the public, and political pressure within the Labour Party the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeves, has decided to ditch the proposal to raise income tax. Against this backdrop, the aim of this post is to examine why it is notconstitutionally prudent to go beyond the boundaries of what has been sanctioned by the electorate. This will be done through the lens of a popular notion of sovereignty that places great weight on the doctrine of the manifesto and, more specifically, the value in governing towards known objectives and pursuing policies underpinned by consent.  

Popular Sovereignty

Following victory in the 2024 general election, in his first speech as Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer claimed the nation had given the Labour Party a “clear mandate”. Similarly, Reeves stated the British people had voted for change and she had “begun the work necessary to deliver on that mandate” by implementing the economic ideas set out in the Labour Party’s manifesto. While in one of his first acts as Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, Ed Miliband’s lifting of the onshore wind ban was justified on the grounds of the new Labour government being “elected with a mandate to take immediate action to boost Britain’s energy independence”.

Whether intentional or not, the stress placed on the direct and guiding relationship between the electoral consent given by the British people and the implementation of policies—that were included in the manifesto ‘Change’—aligns with a popular view of sovereignty and differs from the traditional and widely taught view of parliamentary sovereignty—as set out by constitutional theorist A.V. Dicey. The former understands the ultimate source of authority or the sovereign will of a state to lie with the people. Therefore, a popular notion of sovereignty sees Parliament—the House of Commons or, more specifically, the elected majority within it—as the institutional instrument through which sovereign will is expressed. While Dicey’s version argues that the ultimate source of authority in the state was found diffused across Parliament (the King, House of Lords, and House of Commons) and the laws it created. 

The most important difference between the two versions of sovereignty is that Dicey excluded any direct relationship between the citizenry or electors’ will and Acts of Parliament. More specifically, no Act passed in law gained its authority from, or could be justified on the grounds of, electoral consent or the people. Popular sovereignty, on the other hand, understands that while people cannot govern themselves they are able to delegate, through elections, the business of government. Therefore, Parliament and the elected majority within becomes the institution that directly channels the people and, importantly, derives a right to exercise sovereign power. As a result, the authority to pursue and enact a policy or legislative agenda derives from the sovereign will in the state i.e., the people. This idea has historically been a constitutional position that leading figures in the Labour Party have developed and adopted—as I have outlined in more detail elsewhere. 

The Doctrine of the Manifesto

A natural implication of the popular notion of sovereignty, as explained above, is the emphasis placed on "mandation" or "consent". By this I mean a political party who persuade the people—who are the ultimate source of authority in the state—and wins an election obtain the necessary approval required to govern.Indeed, even governments who rule over passive or apathetic populations still do so by consent if they have come to power through an electoral process. Some might dispute the idea we can truly capture the opinion of the people in our electoral system and an era of low vote shares. Nonetheless, this does not detract from the fact that to be a true vehicle for the sovereign will and responsive to the consent given there must be a rejection of the idea that governing is simply an ever adjustable and undefined process. More specifically, it cannot be understood as a process that involves negotiating policies or making laws that are wholly independent of the sovereign will. Instead, governing by consent means advancing towards a known objective. With this in mind, the manifesto—the document presented to the electorate during a general election, containing a specified political and policy programme for government—acquires critical constitutional significance.  

Firstly, it helps us to shift away from the idea that elections and the will of the sovereign or, more generally speaking, the opinion of the electorate is of no permanent value and unable to produce identifiable ends. The state of mind of the people and consent given to a manifesto during an election is sui generis and its product is equally sui generis. That is because a manifesto provides a viable constitutional method for people to collectively funnel their approval or sanction the initiation of a specific set of policies. In this way, the manifesto provides a workable method to collect the view the people and prevents the elected majority in Parliament, during a five-year period, drifting further and further away from the life of the nation and its people. Or, in other words, it provides a roadmap towards the destination desired by the country. 

Secondly, the parameters created by a manifesto embodies those elected with the authority to act or not act in certain ways. For example, would-be MPs commit themselves to carrying out the provisions of a manifesto and are then bound by a collective duty to implement its content when elected. This also means MPs who make up the elected majority in Parliament querying and challenging a policy decision that does not have popular sanction and strays well beyond the boundaries of a manifesto. As such, what is desired by the nation should always remain a fundamental constitutional concern that is acknowledged and adhered to by representatives. The views of John Wheatley—Christian socialist and Housing Minister in the 1924 minority Labour government—about manifestos are instructive. In 1920, when campaigning against the Liberal-Conservative coalition government’s housing policy that weakened rent control, he claimed "the voice of the people is the voice of Parliament and however much we may hate a law we must obey that law because it expresses the will of the people”. Tellingly, when suggesting Acts of Parliament were a direct expression of popular will, Wheatley also argued there would be no mandate to pursue legislative initiatives if it did not have electoral consent. He claimed

“but what is our duty if a law is made—not only without popular sanction—but in direct violation of the conditions on which its members were sent to Parliament? Surely we owe no allegiance whatever or respect to Members of Parliament as individuals divested of their representative capacity? When they exceed their authority derived from the people they have no authority”. 

The principal point made is that the doctrine of the manifesto provides a relatively clear constitutional answer to the question about whether an elected majority in Parliament can introduce a major change in social or economic policy that the public has not expressed a view on at an election. Finally, the manifesto is a clear way in which to prioritise the sovereignty of the people vis à vis other branches of the British constitution. More specifically, it does this by restricting the creation and coordination of a policy, that has not commanded electoral support, by members of the government—who over the course of five years may lose sight of what their original aims were or succumb to the concerns of special interests or lobbyist. Overall, the manifesto, according to some, represents an ‘outsiders ideology’ that looks to safeguard the interests of the people. 

Significance of breaking manifesto pledges

So, based on the above, what might the constitutional and practical consequences be where the doctrine of the manifesto is disregarded?

Firstly, one might expect a stream of dissatisfaction from the source of all sovereignty i.e., the people. This discontent might be difficult to ascertain, but where manifesto pledges are not observed MPs must be sensitive to their mandate and public opinion or pressure—which political polling, despite its flaws, and views of constituents can provide. Of course, some might argue there are pressing and valid reasons of national interest for departing from the policies set out in a manifesto—the will of a minister in government or among MPs within the elected majority won’t always align with the will of the represented. But where a pledge had been made, is deliberately violated, and goes against the grain of popular wishes acute attention should be given by MPs to determine the extent of the mandate that has been entrusted to the elected majority in Parliament. Or, in other words, is there scope after written and spoken promises not to raise income tax to go on and do so? Challenges might arise where the manifesto itself is written in a vague, contradictory, or non-committal way that is open to interpretation. Nevertheless, where they honestly conclude there is little room for manoeuvre there should always be a rejection of the policy.  

Secondly, where the elected majority falls short in their obligation to carry out the programme on which they were elected, the electorate is perfectly entitled to pass judgement on their performance at the next election. Of course, this might sound obvious and not carry much weight when we are few years away from the next nation-wide polling date. However, the severe end of breaching public trust can be corrosive and difficult to recover from—which recent opinion polling has shown this to be true. This speaks to a wider concern about the health of our democracy. Where politicians are unable to be trusted and implement what they repeatedly promise to do, it becomes almost impossible to govern from a position of morality or in the common good. Even worse, it risks the public viewing any future elected majority in Parliament and government being unable to do what they have been tasked to. This road can only lead to greater apathy, less civic engagement, and an intense distrust of institutional structures to reform the moral and economic health of the nation. 

We might also view a manifesto breach as a crisis of legitimacy. The failure to implement cuts to Winter Fuel and Personal Independence Payments and raise income tax can be argued to mostly have resulted from the electorally unsanctioned nature of the policies, not a lack of political strategy by the Labour government. Doubtless, the Labour government has continually found it difficult to implement policies that are devoid of consent—it remains an open question as to whether plans to lift the two-child benefit cap, which was not sanctioned by the electorate, will face the same fate. Therefore, where a fundamental departure from a manifesto commitment is necessary, it is open to the Prime Minister to call a general election and seek the consent of the people for a new policy platform. Such an approach is the most constitutionally appropriate response to a sharp and substantive change in policy and could alleviate the questions around legitimacy. 

I end by answering Wheatley’s original question: can allegiance really be owed by MPs to a policy when they are being asked to exceed the authority conferred on them by the people? Clearly, for those of us who believe in popular sovereignty and the doctrine of the manifesto it becomes difficult to reconcile support for any dramatic change in economic or social policy that has not commanded electoral consent. This is despite the strong arguments that might be made, for example, about raising income tax and its attempt to embody ideas of social solidarity and widespread contribution. As such, the answer will always be no. 

Dr. Sanjit Nagi is a historian of constitutional law, Labour Party history, and rights.